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A Revolution in English Moral Theology 
LINWOOD URBAN* 
In his excellent study, The Spirit of Anglicanism in the lyth Cen­
tury,1 H. R. McAdoo stresses the dependence of early Anglican Moral 
Theology upon St. Thomas Aquinas. Bishop McAdoo makes so 
impressive a case that it would now be irresponsible to deny that 
Anglicans were more familiar with the Summa Theologica than had 
been thought and that St. Thomas exerted an extensive influence 
upon Anglican Theology with respect to organization and substance. 
Although Bishop McAdoo notes that Anglican authors often treated 
the material of the Summa Theologica with originality and were not 
slavishly dependent upon it, nonetheless the unwary reader might 
conclude that the essential positions of the Summa were represented 
in English theological writings. It is this conclusion which this 
paper will investigate with regard to a particularly important issue 
in moral philosophy. That issue is the relationship between what 
Kant called the Law of Nature and the Moral Law. To put the matter 
simply: Is an action morally right because it conforms to the Law 
of Nature, or, contrarily, is the Law of Nature to be followed because 
it conforms to the Moral Law? In the first of these positions, the 
specific requirements of the Moral Law are derived from the Law of 
Nature. In the second, the Moral Law is autonomous. The Law of 
Nature, also autonomous, is to be followed only when it conforms to 
the Moral Law. 
Anglican Moral Theology begins with St. Thomas and the first 
view and then gradually moves to the second. While Richard Hooker 
restates St. Thomas's position on the relationship between the Law 
of Nature and the Moral Law, Joseph Butler reverses this relationship. 
It is this radical shift in English moral thinking which this paper 
seeks to demonstrate and explain. The crux of the change lies in 
Hooker's modification of one of St. Thomas's critical theses; and, 
once accepted, this modification made inevitable the reversal of the 
relationship between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature. In order 
to make clear the steps in this revolution, we shall first examine the 
views of St. Thomas and Richard Hooker. We shall next briefly in­
vestigate the views of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More. Finally 
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we shall see the revolution completed in the writings of Joseph 
Butler. Of course we will not attempt to document all aspects of this 
radical change, nor will we claim that any of these men represented 
what might be called the moral view of their time. Rather we are 
maintaining that in the writings of these four influential thinkers 
we find the steps of a logical progression from one type of ethical 
theory to another. It is the steps of this logical progression which is 
our concern and not other historical questions, which are interesting 
and important in their own right.2 
ST. THOMAS AND HOOKER ON THE MEANING OF "GOOD" 
In his treatment on Law, St. Thomas makes the following points:3 
1) "Every agent acts on account of an end, and 'to be an end' 
carries the meaning of 'to be good/ " 
2) "Consequently the first principle of the practical reason is 
based on the meaning of 'good,' namely 'it is what all things seek 
after.' " 
3) "Since 'being goal' has the meaning of 'an end,' . . . it follows 
that reason naturally apprehends as good objectives the things to-
ward which man has a natural tendency." 
It is important to note that St. Thomas has presented us with a 
deduction. Since "good" means "end" or "that toward which some-
thing tends," and since all men naturally tend to do certain things, 
human goods can be characterized as those ends toward which human 
beings naturally tend. Hence men naturally take as good those ob-
jectives toward which they have a natural tendency. To this St. 
Thomas adds that, because men have a natural tendency toward 
self-preservation, "they naturally apprehend life as a good."4 Thus 
the conclusion that the preservation of life is a good follows analyti-
cally from the definition of "good" as "end" when taken with the 
premise that men have a natural instinct for self-preservation. Thus 
one can evidently know that certain actions are good in virtue of 
Right Reason, e.g., analytical reasoning. 
It is also important to make clear the dependence of the Moral 
Law upon the Law of Nature. "Good" is defined in terms of "end," 
that is, in terms of a natural property. In order to discover what is 
2 Cf. H. R. McAdoo, The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology (Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1949)/ for such a treatment. 
3 Summa Theologica, I II 94 2 in corpore. I have used the Latin-English text 
found in ST., Blackfriars, 1963, v. 28, p. 8of. In the main, I have followed the En-
glish translation given there. 
4 Ibid., p. 82. 
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good for a particular being, it is necessary to discover what its end is. 
When we have discovered that toward which something always or 
for the most part tends, we have discovered its good. Hence it is im-
possible to know what the good of some being is without knowing 
the Natural Law which governs the activities of that being. Since 
"the good ought always to be sought and done,"5 the primary rule of 
the Moral Law can be stated as: Act in conformity with nature. 
Having just given an account of the meaning of "good" in the 
Summa, we are in a position to observe that in his Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity Hooker follows St. Thomas very closely. 
God alone excepted, who actually and everlastingly is whatsoever he may 
be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not; all other 
things besides are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in 
act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby 
they incline to something which they may be; and when they are it, they 
shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are contained 
under the general name of Goodness.6 
For Hooker like St. Thomas, "to be good" means "to have attained 
one's completion or perfection." Thus the good of any being is that 
toward which it tends or that for which it has a natural appetite. Like 
St. Thomas, Hooker also draws the conclusion that self-preservation 
is a good because all things naturally seek it. 
The first degree of goodness is that general perfection which all things do 
seek, in desiring the continuance of their being.7 
So it is not surprising that Hooker should conclude that Human Na-
ture, understood as the final cause or end toward which men naturally 
tend, is the source of all our moral rules. 
The knowledge of that which man is in reference unto himself, and other 
things in relation unto man, I may justly term the Mother of all those 
principles, which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees, in that Law of 
Nature, whereby human actions are framed.8 
To be sure, neither Hooker nor St. Thomas believes that we can dis-
cover all that we need to know about man's end by natural reason. 
Nonetheless, the fact that we learn what man's last end is from 
revelation does not negate the claim that "the human good" means 
"man's end" or "human nature in its fulfillment." 
5 Îbià., p. 80. 
6 The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (Oxford, 1874), Vol. I, "Laws etc.," Bk. I, 
ch. 5, p. 215. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., Bk. I, ch. 8, p. 230. 
8 A Revolution in English Moral Theology 
Thus far we have noted that Richard Hooker agrees with St. 
Thomas concerning the definition of "good." He also agrees that that 
toward which a being has a natural appetite or tendency is its good. 
Hence he agrees that the primary moral rule is: Act in conformity 
with nature. We must now examine the important divergences be-
tween the position expressed in the Summa and that found in 
Hooker's Laws. 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULAR ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
Hooker and St. Thomas disagree about the way in which particular 
ethical principles are known to be true. St. Thomas regards these 
principles as analytically true, true in virtue of the meanings of the 
terms. Hooker regards them as self-evident to the rational man. An 
example may help to elucidate this difference. Up until the end of the 
nineteenth century, many mathematicians held that men merely in-
tuitively apprehended the truth of the proposition "In a plane a 
straight line is the shortest distance between two points." More re-
cently, mathematicians have argued that this same proposition is 
evident not because men intuitively apprehend its truth, but be-
cause it is analytically true. It is true in virtue of the meanings of 
the terms. When we understand the meaning of "straight line" and 
"the shortest distance between two points," we can see the truth 
of the proposition because the predicate is part of the definition of 
"straight line." Thus both schools of thought agree that the proposi-
tion is obviously true, but they give different accounts of what it 
means to be true. In exactly the same way, Hooker and St. Thomas 
give different accounts of the manner in which ethical principles are 
said to be known. However, since this interpretation of St. Thomas's 
position is not the standard interpretation, we must argue for it. 
In Medieval Philosophy, the phrase which denotes "analytically 
known" is per se nota. For example, William of Ockham explains: 
"A proposition per se nota is one which is evidently known from a 
knowledge of its terms."9 
This definition is of a proposition per se nota in the proper sense 
of that phrase. Ockham does allow for an improper sense of per se 
nota which means only "self-evident" in the weaker sense as ex-
plained above. However, the improper sense of per se nota need not 
concern us because it is clear that, in the relevant sections of the 
Summa, St. Thomas restates Ockham's definition of per se nota in 
its proper sense. 
9 Í Sententiarum (Lyon 1491), prologium, q. I 1 E: Propositio per se nota est illa 
quae scitur evidenter ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius. 
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A proposition is per se nota whose predicate belongs to the intelligible 
meaning of its subject.10 
St. Thomas adds that there are some propositions which are per se 
nota in their natures, but which may not be known in this way to 
all. For example: "Man is a rational animal" is analytically true 
because "man" means "rational animal." However, someone who 
does not know the meaning of "man" might yet know that this 
proposition is true; but he would have to know this fact in some 
other way, perhaps by induction. Thus St. Thomas is affirming that, 
among per se nota propositions, some are self-evident to all; others 
can be known to be analytically true only to wise men after careful 
examination. 
St. Thomas believes without question that there are many ethical 
principles which are analytically known or per se nota. In the same 
article of the Summa, he enunciates the principle: "Good is to be 
done and evil to be avoided." From the context, it is clear that this 
principle is to be taken as per se nota in its proper sense and thus is 
analytically true. If one knows what "good" means, then one knows 
that good is to be done. If one knows what "evil" means, then one 
can from that fact alone know that evil is to be avoided. Furthermore, 
St. Thomas does not think that only very general moral principles 
are per se nota; some particular principles are also per se nota. He 
not only says, "The first general precepts of the law of nature are 
analytically known to one in possession of natural reason,"11 but he 
also says that such precepts are contained in the Decalogue. In the 
Ten Commandments are contained moral principles analytically self-
evident to all. The Decalogue also implicitly contains other precepts 
which are known to be analytically true only to those who have the 
requisite knowledge of the meanings of the terms. There are 
. . . those [precepts] which are primary and general which . . . are in-
scribed in natural reason as analytically known, such as^ that one should 
do evil to no one, and others such; and those which are found, on careful 
examination on the part of wise men, to be in accord with reason.12 
10 S.T. I II, 94 2 in corpore, p. 78: . . . propositio dicitur per se nota cujus 
praedicatum est de ratione subjecti. 
11 S.T. I II 100 4 ad 1, Vol. 29, p. 70: Sicut enim prima praecepta communia 
legis naturae sunt per se nota habenti rationem naturalem. 
12 S.T. I II 100 3 in corpore, Vol. 29, p. 64: . . . ilia scilicet quae sunt prima et 
communia, quorum non oportet aliam editionem esse nisi quod sunt scripta in 
ratione naturali quasi per se nota, sicut quod nulli debet homo malefacere, et alia 
hujusmodi; et iterum ilia quae per diligentem inquisitionem sapientum inveniun-
tur rationi convenire. . . . 
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Of course the Decalogue also contains precepts which are per se nota 
only to the man in whom God has infused faith. The prohibitions 
against blasphemy and against images are of this last type. How­
ever, the fact still remains that for St. Thomas all Ten Command­
ments are analytically self-evident either to natural reason or to rea­
son infused by faith.13 
Having established that some precepts of the Moral Law are self-
evident because they are analytically true and that some of these 
analytically self-evident precepts are contained in the Decalogue, we 
are now in a position to examine a text which has given St. 
Thomas's translators a great deal of difficulty: 
All moral precepts must, of necessity, belong to the law of nature, though 
not all in the same way. There are some which immediately and of them­
selves the natural reason of every man judges to be done or not to be done, 
such as "Honor thy father and thy mother," and, "Thou shalt not kill," 
"Thou shalt not steal." These belong to the law of nature absolutely. 
Others there are which are judged by the wise to be done in the light of 
more careful consideration. These, indeed, belong to the law of nature, but 
as necessitating instruction on the part of ordinary people by the 
wise... . 1 4 
Translators of this passage have had a great deal of difficulty in ren­
dering the per se (of itself) found at the beginning of the second 
sentence. They have tended to translate it in such a way that the 
sentence gives the impression that the sample commands are just self-
evident and not analytically self-evident.15 
13 S.T. III100 3 in corpore. 
14 S.T. I II 100 1 in corpore, Vol. 29, p. $8ί: . . . omnia praecepta moralia per-
tineant ad legem naturae, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per 
se ratio naturalis cujuslibet hominis dijudicat esse facienda vel non facienda; 
sicut, "Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuum," et, "Non occides," "Non furtum 
fades." Et hujusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae 
subtilori consideratione rationis a sapientibus judicantur esse observanda. Et ista 
sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tarnen indigeant disciplina, qua minores a sapien-
tioribus instruantur.. . 
15 Cf. A. Pegis, Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (Random House, 1945), 
Vol. II, p. 828: "For there are certain things which the natural reason of every 
man, of its own accord, and at once, judges to be done or not to be done." St. 
Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica (Blackfriars, 1969), Vol. 29, trans. D. 
Bourke and A. Littledale, p. 59fr "There are some which the natural reason of 
every man judges straightway to be done or not to be done." The Pocket Aquinas, 
ed. V. J. Bourke, Washington Square Press, i960, p. 20of: "For, there are some 
things that the natural reason of every man judges immediately and essentially as 
things to be done or not to be done. . ." The linguistic evidence is certainly in 
favor of coupling the per se with the quae and not with the ratio naturalis as 
these translators have done. This evidence further strengthens the interpretation 
given above. 
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But it is clear from the other passages which have been cited 
that in this passage the commands cannot be merely self-evident, 
but are analytically self-evident. St. Thomas seems to be saying that 
the commands of the Decalogue are self-evident in virtue of the 
meanings of the terms, and not just that everyone recognizes their 
truth. If one knows the meaning of "father," he knows that a father 
is to be honored; if he knows the meaning of "steal," he knows that 
one ought not to steal; and if he knows what "murder" means, he 
knows that one ought not to murder. In St. Thomas's strict use of 
"deduction," these principles are not deductively arrived at, because 
no premises are employed. However, in the looser twentieth century 
usage, his is a deductive ethics. As a caution, it is important to point 
out that for St. Thomas moral philosophy is not purely deductive 
even in the contemporary sense of that term. Many contingent facts 
must be taken into account in deciding what to do in particular 
circumstances. The contingent facts of the situation are always im-
portant in applying general rules. Sometimes even exceptions to 
these rules must be countenanced.16 But the conclusion remains that 
the general precepts of the natural law are analytically self-evident. 
In the passages cited above, St. Thomas employs "the natural law" 
in the sense of "moral law." We must now ask: What is the rela-
tionship between these analytically self-evident precepts of the Moral 
täw to the Law of Nature, understood as what beings naturally 
do? Another way to put this question is to ask: Why should one take 
a statement which is per se nota as imposing a moral requirement 
upon men? St. Thomas's answer links the discussion of the analyti-
cally true precepts to his earlier discussion of the Law of Nature. 
Therefore, since human conduct is said to be directed toward reason, which 
is the proper principle of human action, that conduct is said to be good 
which is congruent with reason, and whatever is in discord with reason 
is called evil.17 
One ought to take analytically true principles as morally binding, 
not only because they are true, but also because action in accord 
with reason is a natural tendency of man, and hence is good. Thus 
the two parts of St. Thomas's discussion, the "good" as "end" and 
"natural tendency," and the self-evident moral principles, are 
brought into close harmony. 
16 S.T. III 94 4 in corpore. 
Tj S.T. I II 100 1 in corpore: Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad 
rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur 
boni qui rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant. 
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HOOKER'S TREATMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF 
MORAL PRINCIPLES 
If this interpretation of St. Thomas is correct, we can now see how 
Hooker departs from him. Where St. Thomas thinks the simple pre-
cepts of the Moral Law to be analytically true, Hooker regards them 
as merely evident to natural reason. In an important passage in the 
Laws, Hooker mentions two ways to know the good: 
And of discerning goodness there are but these two ways; the one, the 
knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other, the observa-
tion of those signs and tokens, which being annexed always unto goodness, 
argue that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we 
know not the cause by force whereof it is there.18 
He goes on to observe that "the former of these is the most sure and 
infallible way, but so hard that all shun it." 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know what Hooker means by 
"the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such." He might 
mean that it is hard to discover the reasons why something ought to 
be taken as good; or he might mean that it is difficult to discover the 
good which is proper to a being by studying the causes why some-
thing is the kind of thing that it is, i.e. by discovering why it has 
a particular nature. The first interpretation fits the natural sense of the 
passage, but the second interpretation is congruent with what he 
has already said when he defines the good of a being as the perfec-
tion or completion of its nature. In any event, it is unnecessary for 
us to reach a conclusion concerning Hooker's meaning, since he 
proceeds to follow the second way. 
Into the causes of goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; 
to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at 
hand that easily they may be conceived without any far-removed dis-
course. 
The premise which Hooker adopts as the basis for following the 
second way is that there is an invariable connection between signs 
of goodness and goodness itself. From this premise one can argue 
that "where they are found, there also is goodness." Since Hooker 
does not attempt to give an account of this invariable relationship, 
it is safest to assume that he takes this relationship as a given and 
not to attempt to speculate upon Hooker's reasons for believing that 
there is one. It is sufficient for us to observe that Hooker believes 
18 Laws, 18, p. 226. 
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that there is an invariable connection between the signs and tokens 
of goodness and goodness itself and to proceed on that basis. 
"The most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general 
persuasion of all men do so account it."19 For a general agreement of 
mankind nothing more is needed than the intuitive self-evidence 
of propositions under consideration. Additional passages support this 
interpretation. 
The main principles of Reason are in themselves apparent. For to make 
nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding were to take away all 
possibility of knowing any thing. And herein that of Theophrastus is 
true, "They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow Reason." 
In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being 
proposed the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all pos-
sibility of error, clear and manifest without proof. In which kind axi-
oms or principles more general are such as this, "that the greater good is 
to be chosen before the less."20 
Hooker claims the same intuitive self-evidence for the precepts of 
the Decalogue and the Golden Rule. 
Axioms . . . so manifest that they need no further proof, are such as 
these, "God to be worshipped;" "parents to be honoured;" "others to be 
used by us as we ourselves would be by them." Such things, as soon as 
they are alleged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof 
or further discourse to be assured of their goodness.21 
One might speculate as to the reasons why Hooker departs in this 
most significant way from St. Thomas. A likely explanation is that 
he mistook the meaning of per se nota where it appears in the 
Summa. Since per se nota literally means "known through itself," 
it would be quite easy to take it as meaning only "self-evident" and 
not as "analytically true." We have already shown that such a read-
ing of St. Thomas is incorrect. We shall now point out the far-
reaching consequences of such an emendation. 
If the precepts of the Moral Law are merely self-evident, then 
knowledge of these precepts is reached independently of our knowl-
edge of the natural. Thus, although "Act according to nature" is still 
the primary moral rule, we need not know what our nature is in 
order to know many of our duties. The autonomy of the precepts of 
the Moral Law has a second consequence. In order to connect the 
intuitively apprehended precepts of that law with natural tendencies, 
19 Ibid., p. 226. 
20 Ibid., p. 228. 
21 Ibid., p. 229. 
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Hooker does something very different from what St. Thomas does. 
Where St. Thomas aifirms that because men have a natural tendency 
to be rational, to act according to reason is a good, Hooker makes 
a different point. He asserts that because men naturally judge certain 
actions to be good, this fact in itself reveals that they are acting 
according to nature. In putting his argument, Hooker falls back 
upon the Aristotelean dictum that "For of things necessarily and 
naturally done there is no more aifirmed but this, They keep either 
always or for the most part one tenure/ "22 From this he argues that 
. . . although we know not the cause, yet thus much we know; that some 
necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgments of all men generally or 
for the most part run one and the same way, especially in matters of 
natural discourse.23 
Thus Hooker has changed the relationship between the self-evident 
Moral Law and the Law of Nature. For example, although he agrees 
with St. Thomas that because men have a natural tendency toward 
self-preservation, they apprehend life as a good, Hooker can also say 
that because men universally apprehend life as a good, this apprehen-
sion itself indicates that the preservation of life is a law of their 
nature. This change of view is of the greatest significance. It lays the 
groundwork for the position taken by Joseph Butler a century and 
a half later. Since the precepts of the Moral Law are known inde-
pendently of the Law of Nature, in Butler's view the Law of Nature 
is to be followed only if it is in conformity with the Moral Law. 
However, before we examine the views of Joseph Butler, we shall 
further document the departure from Thomist principles in the 
writings of Henry More. 
MORE'S TREATMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ETHICS AND THE LAW OF NATURE 
In his Enchiridion Ethicum, Henry More departs significantly from 
St. Thomas and Hooker concerning the relationship between the 
Moral Law and the Law of Nature. Where for St. Thomas as well as 
for Hooker the primary ethical precept is "Act in conformity with 
nature," More regards actions in conformity with nature as only a 
means to the good life. He does not regard the perfection of a nature 
as its highest good, but only as an instrument by which that good 
can be attained. Hence the human good is not characterized by ref-
22 Ibid., p. 227. 
23 Ibid. 
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erence to human nature. It is autonomously characterized as happi-
ness or pleasure. 
In what has just been said, we have carefully avoided saying that 
More defines "good" as "happiness." In fact, he gives no formal 
definition of "good." He approaches his subject in another way, with 
the question "What is the highest good?" and not "What do we 
mean by good?" 
Early in the Enchiridion he implicitly identifies happiness or 
pleasure as the greatest good by remarking that "Ethicks are divided 
into two parts, The Knowledge of Happiness, and the Acquisition of 
it."2é He made the identification more explicit by arguing that all 
people desire "to live therein, or at least not without it/' From this 
he argues only that men "highly value" pleasure and not, as did St. 
Thomas, that since the desire for pleasure is a natural tendency, 
pleasure is a good.25 Thus, although More does not tell us whether 
or not "greatest good" means simply "happiness," he makes it clear 
that whatever the good, we seek it for the sake of pleasure. 
More also believes that we can achieve happiness only when we 
live according to nature. Quoting from Aristotle, he describes 
pleasure as "A Restitution of every Creature from a state imperfect, 
or preternatural, unto its own proper Nature."2* "And . . . that 
Restitution unto such a State must be the most intrinsic and pe-
culiar Pleasure."27 
For More, then, one could not be happy unless one fulfilled his 
nature. But in addition one could not be happy unless one were 
virtuous. For virtue is connected to nature as nature is connected to 
happiness. 
Now a true Feeling and Possession of Virtue, is also the conversion or 
bringing a man about, from what is contrary to his Nature, to that which is 
conformable to it. . . . For (as the Emperor Marcus Aurelius observes) to 
act according to Nature or according to Reason, is in a rational Creature the 
same thing. Wherefore all pravity is repugnant to human Nature. But 
. . . Virtue is natural to human nature.28 
Hence, "this is plain, that such inward Working and Conformity to 
Virtue's Law, is that which dominates true Happiness."2* 
24 Enchiridion Ethicum, English Translation of 1690 (Facsimile Text Society, 
1930), p. 3· 
25 Ibid., pp. 4&5· 
26 Ibid., p. 5. 
27 Ibid., p. 6. 
28 Ibid., p. 5f. 
29 Ibid., p. 7. 
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With More we are in a different world from that of St. Thomas or 
of Hooker. By means of the virtuous life, we conform to nature; 
and by conformity with nature, we achieve our highest happiness or 
greatest good. Where St. Thomas and Hooker affirm that "what is 
natural to man is virtuous," More only affirms that "virtue is natural 
to man." Both St. Thomas and More agree that "happiness is a good 
because all men desire it"; but they treat this proposition in dif-
ferent ways. St. Thomas argues that happiness is a good because the 
pursuit of it is natural to man. More argues that happiness is a good 
because man's constant pursuit of it shows that men highly value it. 
As a result the Law of Nature is not that by which the Moral Law is 
to be specified. Conformity to the Law of Nature now merely serves 
the requirements of the Moral Law. Thus the relationship between 
the two has been radically altered. 
HENRY MORE'S TREATMENT OF SELF-EVIDENT 
MORAL PRECEPTS 
Henry More follows Hooker in treating the precepts of the Moral 
Law as intuitively self-evident and not as analytically true. Hç 
echoes Hooker in quoting from Aristotle that "some things are in-
telligible tho men know not the reason why." He then goes on to 
draw forth a stock of . . . Principles, as being immediately and irresist-
ibly true, need no proof; such, I mean, as all Moral Reason may in a sort 
have reference unto; even as all Mathematical Demonstrations are found in 
some first undeniable Axioms.30 
Of these undeniable axioms, he further says: 
These and such like Sayings may justly be called Moral Axioms or 
Noemas: for they are so clear and evident of themselves, that, if men con-
sider impartially, they need no manner of Deduction or Argument, but are 
agreed to as soon as heard. And thus we are prepared, as with so many 
Touchstones, to let the inquisitive know what Right Reason is. For in 
short, it is that which by certain and necessary Consequences, is at 
length resolved into some intellectual Principle which is immediately 
true?1 
Lest it be thought that "the certain and necessary Consequence" is 
analytic necessity, it is sufficient to examine a few of the Axioms 
and Noemas proposed by More. Although "What is good is to be 
chosen; what is evil to be avoided," could be taken as analytic, he 
also cites others which are clearly not analytic. "Among the several 
30 Ibid., p. 20. 
31 Ibid., p. 27. 
LINWOOD URBAN *7 
kinds or degrees of sensible Beings which are in the world, some are 
better and more excellent than others." "In things of which we 
have no experience, we must believe those who profess themselves 
to have experience"; and "return good for good, and not evil for 
good."32 Thus it is even clearer than it was in Hooker's case that for 
More, "self-evident" means merely "intuitively apprehended." 
THE COMPLETION OF THE REVOLUTION IN JOSEPH BUTLER 
We have come a long way from St. Thomas. Ethical principles are 
intuitively apprehended; and the Law of Nature serves the good and 
is not that by which we define the Moral Law. No clearer statement 
of these views is found anywhere than in the writings of Joseph 
Butler. He explicitly says that the Moral Law is intuitively appre-
hended. 
That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having 
a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. . . . That 
we have this moral approving and disapproving faculty, is certain from 
our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other.33 
This moral faculty he sometimes called "conscience," and he em-
phatically states that the approbation of conscience is the only source 
of obligation. 
But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet it 
may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and follow 
it?" . . . That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of 
action, is itself alone an obligation.34 
One ought to stress the importance of this last passage for an 
understanding of Butler's moral theory. If the special moral faculty 
alone attests to the presence of an obligation, then a natural de-
scription of an action will not establish its moral worth. Something 
else will be needed, the attestation of conscience. Hence Butler can 
not agree with St. Thomas that if one knows what murder is, he 
knows that murder is wrong, or that if we know what a father is, 
then we know analytically that we ought to honor our parents. 
"That your conscience approves and attests to such a course of action 
is itself alone an obligation." 
Butler's Intuitivism has further implications for the relationship ) 
between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature. Instead of the Law of 
32 Ibid., pp. 22-25. 
33 "Dissertation II: Of the Nature of Virtue," The Analogy of Religion, etc., 
George Bell & Sons, 1898, p. 334Í. 
34 "Sermon III," Ibid., pp. 4iof. * 
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Nature defining the good, and thus it ought to be followed, Butler 
can only argue that the Law of Nature ought to be followed when it 
is in agreement with the Moral Law. After noting that "Reasonable 
self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the 
nature of man," he concludes that self-interest can be followed be-
cause "Conscience and self-love . . . always lead in the same way. 
Duty and interest are perfectly coincident.. ,"35 
Whether or not Butler was correct in his assertion that duty and 
interest are thus practically identical, it is nonetheless true that he 
has completely reversed the relationship between the Moral Law and 
the Law of Nature as it appeared in Hooker and St. Thomas. As far 
as our knowledge of it is concerned, the Moral Law is now fully in-
dependent of the natural order of things. The epistemological in-
dependence of the Moral Law had far reaching consequences, not 
only for Butler's moral theology, but also for his natural theology. 
For he was now in a position to lay the groundwork for a form of 
the Teleological Argument which has had a venerable history. One 
form of the Teleological Argument is found in St. Thomas's Fifth 
Way. We note that in human affairs adaptation of means to ends is 
always the result of intelligent behavior. We also observe the 
adaptation of means to ends in the natural world. It is then argued 
that by analogy we must conclude that there must be an intelligent 
designer for the natural world.36 
It is important to observe that in this form of the argument any 
adaptation of means to ends in the natural world will do. The pur-
pose of the argument is limited, to demonstrate only that the 
world has an intelligent designer and not necessarily that the de-
signer has a benevolent purpose. 
However, the Teleological Argument can be put in another form. 
In this form a particular type of order is appealed to, what Harold 
Höffding called the propensity of the natural world for the preserva-
tion of human values. Such an argument was put by F. R. Tennant 
when he argued that nature is productive and protective of the 
moral life.37 
It is not our purpose to discuss the merits of this form of the 
argument. It is rather to note that Butler suggests the possibility of 
such an argument. 
Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of the world 
are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme; and it is highly 
35 "Sermon III," Ibid., p. 414. 
36 S.T. I II 2 3 in corpore. 
37 Philosophical Theology, Vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1930), Chapter 4. 
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probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to 
the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies 
for minds.38 
Thus while St. Thomas argues that self-preservation is a good be-
cause men tend to preserve their own lives, those who followed 
Butler's suggestion can argue that the instinct for self-preservation is 
a good because it tends to keep men alive. Life itself is a good be-
cause it is a necessary condition for the moral life. Nowhere is the 
difference between St. Thomas and Joseph Butler more forcefully 
shown. For the second form of the Teleological Argument can only 
be formulated when our knowledge of the Moral Law is independent 
of the Natural Law. Then one can ask the question: "Does the Law 
of Nature make possible the moral life?" If, however, the primary 
ethical precept is: Act in conformity with nature, then the question 
"Is nature productive of moral values?" cannot arise. For when the 
Moral Law is specified by the Law of Nature, it makes no sense to 
ask: "Does the Law of Nature support the Moral Law?" It is the 
Moral Law. 
CONCLUSION 
In the course of this paper we have commented upon a revolution in 
English moral theory. The decisive step was taken when Hooker 
asserted that moral precepts were merely intuitively self-evident and 
not analytically true. Once this modification was made, the essential 
element in Butler's view was adopted. Having made this logical 
point, one ought to attempt some assessment of the fundamental is-
sues involved. There is a whole nest of difficulties here and in a 
short paper one can only give a sketch of a possible resolution. 
Certainly the central issue is whether moral precepts are analyt-
ically true or merely evident. Does a knowledge of what murder is 
entail that murder is wrong? One of the reasons why Intuitivists 
have adopted their view is because they could not see this analytical 
link. Any empirical description of an act seemed not to entail the 
additional statement that murder is wrong. In his book Moral No-
tions, Julius Kovesi discusses this controversy at length.39 His con-
clusion is that if the description of an act comprises only its ma-
terial components, then the Intuitivist is correct and there is no en-
tailment. By material components of an act, e.g. murder, is meant the 
administration of poison, or the plunging of a knife into the 
heart, or the placing of a pillow over the face. From such descrip-
38 "Analogy of Religion," Ibid., p. 179. 
39 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) passim but espec. Chap. 1. 
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tions it does not follow that these acts are wrong. It is one of the 
strengths of the Intuitivist's position to have noticed this lack of 
entailment. But where the Intuitivists went wrong is in assuming 
that there is some extra non-empirical quality which acts have, i.e. 
goodness, or requiredness, or the like. The difficulty is that we seem 
not to be able to pick out such a quality. Professor Kovesi suggests 
that it is not the material components of an act which are sig-
nificant for ethics, but its formal elements. The point or purpose of 
an action is what is relevant for its moral assessment and not its ma-
terial components. That St. Thomas intended to include the formal 
elements of an action in his description of the act is clear from his 
discussion of lying.40 According to St. Thomas, it is not the ma-
terial elements, speaking a falsehood, but the intention to deceive, 
which constitutes lying. If the formal elements of an act are the rele-
vant ones for moral consideration, then it may be analytically true 
that murder is wrong. If murder is characterized as the intentional 
killing of a human being for personal or private gain, then murder 
may always be wrong. If Mr. Kovesi is correct, St. Thomas is more 
nearly on the right track than is Hooker or Butler. 
Although St. Thomas is correct in the notion that there is a fun-
damental connection between "good" and "end," it does not follow 
that because we naturally tend to do certain things, the objects 
of these natural tendencies are always good. From what has just been 
said, we can only conclude that ends are relevant to moral evalua-
tion, and not that any natural end is a good. In this connection, we 
are not making the point that, since everything which happens is 
natural, it is impossible to divide natural tendencies into some more 
and some less natural. Nor are we making Butler's point that if a 
differentiation is attempted by noting that some desires are stronger 
than others, the relative strength of the impulses is not decisive for 
moral evaluation.41 Nor are we making the point that it is difficult 
to decide what the natural end of an act is. Is the end of sex the 
precreation of children or is it merely the happiness of the partners? 
We are only making the point that although men have a strong 
natural desire to have a large family, it does not follow that the ob-
ject of this desire is always a good. Thus if we are to criticize 
St. Thomas, it is for too readily assuming that the end of a natural 
tendency is always a good, instead of just maintaining that the end 
or point of an action is a highly relevant feature of the action when 
we evaluate its moral worth. 
40 S.T. IIII100. 
41 Ibid., Sermon III, p. 414. 
